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Contingent Valuation, Hypothetical
Bias, and Experimental Economics
James J. Murphy and Thomas H. Stevens
Although the contingent valuation method has been widely used to value a diverse array of non-
market environmental and natural resource commodities, recent empirical evidence suggests it may
not accurately estimate real economic values. The hypothetical nature of environmental valuation
surveys typically results in responses that are significantly greater than actual payments. Economists
have had mixed success in developing techniques designed to control for this “hypothetical bias.”
This paper highlights the role of experimental economics in addressing hypothetical bias, and identi-
fies a gap in the existing literature by focusing on the underlying causes of this bias. Most of the
calibration techniques used today lack a theoretical justification, and therefore these procedures need
to be used with caution. We argue that future experimental research should investigate the reasons
hypothetical bias persists. A better understanding of the causes should enhance the effectiveness of
calibration techniques.
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Consider the challenge faced by a contingent valua-
tion (CV) practitioner who is interested in estimating
the economic value of a non-market good, such as
visibility at a National Park or the protection of
habitat for an endangered species. The CV survey
is carefully designed and constructed (e.g., Mitchell
and Carson, 1989; Champ, Brown, and Boyle, 2004)
and the results are produced with the latest esti-
mation techniques (Haab and McConnell, 2003).
We now have an estimate for the economic value of
the good—but is this value accurate?
The answer to this question has stirred consider-
able, and sometimes contentious debate, as high-
lighted by litigation resulting from the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound [see
Diamond and Hausman (1994); Hanemann (1994);
and Portney (1994) for a synthesis of the debate].
Using only field CV data, we cannot be certain
that value estimates are accurate. Why? Since CV
surveys are hypothetical in both the payment for
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and provision of the good in question, we do not
know whether what an individual says she would
do in a hypothetical setting matches what she will
do when actually given the opportunity to do so.
1
And, without the ability to observe the latter, it is
difficult to confirm whether the values elicited from
a hypothetical survey accurately reflect the real
economic value of the good. Some researchers have
expressed concern that this lack of a consequential
economic commitment in CV surveys often leads to
hypothetical bias in which economic values are
overstated. For example, as Harrison and Rutström
(forthcoming) assert: “As a matter of logic, if you
do not have to pay for the good, but a higher verbal
willingness-to-pay response increases the chance of
its provision, then verbalize away to increase your
expected utility!”
Economics experiments offer the potential to shed
some light on the accuracy of responses to hypo-
thetical CV questions. Experimental research has
a well-established framework which was widely
1 The terms “revealed,” “real,” and “actual” values are used inter-
changeably, and refer to situations in which an individual makes a
consequential economic commitment—in experimental studies, this
typically involves payment for a good by the participant. Most studies of
hypothetical bias assume these cash-based estimates are unbiased. On the
other hand, stated or hypothetical values refer to survey responses that
lack any salient economic commitment.
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Source: Murphy et al., 2003
                 Figure 1. Distribution of calibration factors by type of good
                 (where calibration factor = hypothetical value/actual value)
recognized when Vernon Smith became a co-recip-
ient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics “for
having established laboratory experiments as a tool
in empirical economic analysis.” What distinguishes
experiments from other empirical techniques are
control and replication. The ability to control the
environment under which individuals make eco-
nomic decisions is what gives experiments power.
The experimenter can vary treatments to test hypoth-
eses about the effects of different explanatory
variables on individual choices. Unlike a typical
field CV survey, a carefully designed experiment
can include both hypothetical and real payment
scenarios. By comparing outcomes in these two
settings, one can make some inferences about the
existence of hypothetical bias, its causes, and ways
to mitigate its effects. Moreover, other researchers
can replicate, and perhaps extend, the experiment to
test its robustness. Generally, it is the body of
experimental evidence, rather than a single study,
that allows us to draw more reliable conclusions
about what we do and do not know (Roth, 1988).
The existence of hypothetical bias has been well-
documented in both laboratory and field settings. In
a recent survey of the literature, Harrison and
Rutström (forthcoming) found a positive bias in 32
of 39 observations. There are two meta-analyses of
the experimental hypothetical bias literature: List
and Gallet (2001) and Murphy et al. (2003). The
latter study updates the List and Gallet data for
some coding differences and conducts a sensitivity
analysis of their results. The results of both meta-
analyses are consistent with findings reported by
Harrison and Rutström, suggesting that mean hypo-
thetical values are about 2.5 to 3 times greater than
actual values (but this comes from a highly skewed
distribution with a median ratio closer to 1.5). Figure
1 presents the distribution of this bias for 83 obser-
vations from 23 studies (Murphy et al., 2003).
Although the presence of this bias is well docu-
mented, its underlying causes are not fully under-
stood. Consequently, this paper highlights the need
for a better understanding of the causes of this bias,
and argues that future experimental research should
focus on this issue.
Contingent Valuation Experiments
Running Experiments to Establish 
Empirical Regularities
Smith (1994) lists a number of reasons why econo-
mists run experiments. The evolution of the experi-
mental CV literature clearly encompasses a subset184   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
of these. A fundamental reason for running experi-
ments is to establish empirical regularities that
guide the development of theory. As noted by
Smith, many advances in science occur as a result
of well-documented regularities and anomalies that
motivated further research. Ultimately, establishing
these stylized facts in the lab can help focus the
efforts of theorists.
Early experimental CV research focused on estab-
lishing the empirical regularity that hypothetical
bias exists, and tested the overall validity of con-
tingent valuation. Bohm’s seminal paper comparing
hypothetical and actual values was published in
1972, but it was not until about a decade later when
this literature began to grow. In a series of papers,
Bishop and Heberlein found that hypothetical
values for hunting permits consistently exceeded
actual values (Bishop and Heberlein, 1979, 1986;
Heberlein and Bishop, 1986).
2 In contrast, Dickie,
Fisher, and Gerking (1987) found that values for
pints of strawberries elicited in a hypothetical
survey were consistent with those observed when
individuals were given an opportunity to actually
purchase the good.
3 Subsequent research, however,
has consistently suggested that values derived from
surveys typically exceed actual values (e.g.,
Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström, 1995; Fox et
al., 1998; List and Shogren, 1998), sometimes by a
substantial margin (e.g., Neill et al., 1994). There
are exceptions to the conclusion about the existence
of hypothetical bias (e.g., Johannesson, 1997;
Sinden, 1988; Smith and Mansfield, 1998), but these
are in the minority.
Common Elements of Valuation Experiments 
and Their Effects on Hypothetical Bias
Valuation experiments have a number of common
elements. A group of subjects is recruited for the
experiment. While these subjects are often univer-
sity students, a substantial number of valuation
experiments are conducted in the field with
non-students [e.g., Champ et al. (1997) surveyed
Wisconsin residents about their willingness to pay
for road removal in the Grand Canyon; and List
(2001) conducted his experiments using people
who attended a sportscard show]. Cummings,
Harrison, and Rutström (1995) recruited subjects
from both undergraduate business classes and from
various church groups; they observed similar
patterns of hypothetical bias in both groups. The
meta-analysis results reported by Murphy et al.
(2003) provide some evidence that, although
hypothetical bias exists with both students and non-
students, the bias may be greater with student sub-
jects. However, because most student experiments
are conducted in group settings, Murphy et al. note
it is unclear whether the effect is due to the subject
pool or the experiment setting.
Subjects participating in a CV experiment are
asked about their value for a specified good. Most
experiments focus on an individual’s willingness to
pay (WTP), although a few studies address
willingness to accept (e.g., Bishop and Heberlein,
1979; Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze, 1987; Smith
and Mansfield, 1998; List and Shogren, 2002). An
important distinction among experiments is the type
of good valued—some studies use private goods,
others public goods. Ultimately, the goal of CV is
to value public goods. However, using private
goods may be convenient because respondents are
often familiar with the good and its substitutes, and
may have considered or engaged in a market trans-
action for the good at some point. Even if the good
is unfamiliar, subjects may be more comfortable
with valuing private goods, whereas the subject
may have never considered placing an economic
value on a public good like atmospheric quality. If
subjects are more comfortable valuing goods they
commonly purchase, then they may be less prone to
error (List and Gallet, 2001). Private goods also
avoid any biases due to free-riding. Another argu-
ment in support of using private goods is that if CV
cannot accurately estimate economic value in these
relatively familiar settings, it is probably unlikely to
do so with public goods. As documented by List
and Gallet (2001), hypothetical bias exists with both
types of goods, but the bias is lower with private
goods. On the other hand, Murphy et al. (2003)
found the evidence mixed regarding any differences
in bias for public and private goods. Later, we will
discuss some potentially important distinctions
between these two types of goods which future
research may need to address.
Nearly all valuation experiments attempt to elicit
what are known as “homegrown” values.
4 This
feature distinguishes valuation experiments from the
prototypical economics experiment. An experimenter
can attempt to control preferences, or can try to
2  Hanemann (1984) highlights the sensitivity of this conclusion.
3  Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming) argue that a more detailed ex-
amination of their data yields mixed results and, on average, hypothetical
values exceed actual values by 58%.
4  Some notable exceptions include Taylor (1998); Burton et al. (2003);
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measure them. In many experiments, such as most
market or public goods games, it is important to be
able to state that individual values vary in particular
ways. Smith (1976) outlines the conditions under
which the use of salient rewards based on experi-
ment performance allows the experimenter to exert
control over individual preferences. Induced value
theory basically states that under the right condi-
tions, the reward medium of the experiment—
typically cash—dominates all other considerations,
and individuals are motivated to maximize their
experimental earnings. In a simple market experi-
ment, for example, sellers may be given a reservation
price that represents the cost of production. These
subjects are told they will be paid, in cash, the
difference between the price at which they trade
and this reservation price. Since higher earnings in
the lab translate into more cash outside the lab,
sellers have the incentive to maximize their experi-
mental earnings by seeking the highest possible
trading price. Similarly, buyers can be given reser-
vation prices that represent redemption values, which
create incentives to maximize consumer surplus.
Because the experimenter assigned the reservation
prices, he or she can construct the market supply
function and market demand function and compare
these with observed outcomes to test hypotheses.
The experiments presented by Anderson (2004) are
an application of induced-value theory.
Most valuation experiments, on the other hand,
do not use induced values. Rather than attempting
to control preferences using induced values, the
researcher tries to measure subjective, homegrown
values [Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004)
discuss some methodological issues that need to be
considered when eliciting subjective values]. As
with an actual field CV study, these homegrown
values cannot be known with certainty. However,
by carefully manipulating the conditions under
which values are elicited, the experimenter can test
whether changes in explanatory variables influence
responses. Most hypothetical bias experiments
include both a hypothetical CV survey and a real
payment scenario. For example, some subjects in
the Champ et al. (1997) Grand Canyon road removal
study were asked a hypothetical contingent dona-
tion question. Other subjects participated in a similar
survey in which they were asked for actual contri-
butions for road removal. Both surveys made clear
that the project was the only source of funding for
the program. The estimated mean WTP in the
hypothetical treatment ($46S$89) was significantly
greater than mean actual contributions ($9).
Because the experimenter is usually eliciting
unknown homegrown values, it is important to
emphasize the inferences which can be drawn from
the results. If hypothetical values exceed actual
values, then the data clearly support the argument
that these values differ. However, without knowing
the true economic value of the good, we make the
reasonable assumption that the responses in the real
settings represent the true economic value, and
therefore the hypothetical values must be over-
stated. Based solely on what can be inferred from
the data, it is entirely possible the converse is true:
i.e., the hypothetical values are accurate and the
real values misstated (Harrison, 2002). This point is
revisited later.
Running Experiments to Develop and Test 
New Calibration Techniques
Experiments can also provide a testing ground for
new institutions (Smith, 1994) or, in the case of CV,
new techniques to calibrate for hypothetical bias.
Because experiments offer a high degree of control,
economists can test the properties of new institutions
or new calibration techniques in a relatively low-cost
setting before they are actually implemented. In the
case of CV calibration, if the techniques fail to ade-
quately account for the bias in a carefully controlled
experiment, then it is unlikely these instruments will
be effective in more complex field settings.
After the Exxon Valdez spill, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
convened a panel of experts led by Nobel laureates
Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow to review CV.
The resulting report (Arrow et al., 1993) influenced
the design of CV studies and the evolution of the
experimental literature. The NOAA panel noted the
“unfortunate” lack of data that could be used to
calibrate CV responses. This inevitably helped
spawn a growing literature in the development and
testing of calibration techniques. These techniques
rest on the assumption that, although responses to
hypothetical CV questions may be biased, these
responses provide useful information about true
economic values.
In response to the NOAA report, Blackburn,
Harrison, and Rutström (1994) developed a simple
statistical bias function using socioeconomic charac-
teristics to estimate the extent to which people over-
state their value.
5 Taking experimental data from
5  The idea of estimating a bias function for public goods was first pro-
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Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström (1995), they
used the bias function estimated using the data from
one experiment to calibrate responses in another
experiment. These calibrated hypothetical responses
are statistically indistinguishable from those in the
real treatment. Mansfield (1998) expands on this
concept by estimating the influence of these indi-
vidual characteristics on the extent of bias, as
opposed to the influence on individual preferences.
More recently, Hofler and List (2004) adopted a
stochastic frontier regression model to successfully
calibrate hypothetical responses to those from an
actual auction for a private good (a baseball card
with a $350 market value). These statistical bias
functions are potentially valuable because they
calibrate for hypothetical bias using data normally
collected in a CV survey. However, apart from
recognizing that individual characteristics might
play an important role in an individual’s valuation
decision, there is no reason a priori to explain why
these particular characteristics matter, or, if they do,
the appropriate econometric model specification.
Using laboratory experiments to calibrate field data,
Fox et al. (1998) note that these calibration functions
may be commodity- and context-specific. Moreover,
results reported by both Mansfield (1998) and List
and Shogren (2002) indicate calibration functions
may also be individual-specific. Thus, while the
approach developed in these papers is promising,
calibration functions may be unique to a particular
situation, and the absence of a theoretical motiva-
tion makes it difficult to generalize the results.
Another ex post technique for mitigating hypo-
thetical bias is the use of an uncertainty adjustment.
The NOAA panel recommended that values be
elicited using a referendum format that included
“no answer” or “don’t know” as an explicit option.
A series of papers focused on the implications of a
“don’t know” response, and more broadly on the
notion of respondent uncertainty—i.e., respondents
may be unsure of their actual value for the good
(Opaluch and Segerson, 1989; Gregory et al., 1995;
Li and Mattsson, 1995; Gregory and Slovic, 1997;
Wang, 1997). This uncertainty might occur because
subjects are unfamiliar with the good described
or how to value it, or perhaps they have not put
explicit thought into how much they value the
good. Moreover, if an individual’s preferences
for the good are formed during the survey, then
the one-shot nature of CV surveys may not provide
an individual with the experience necessary for
these values to stabilize (Loomis and Ekstrand,
1998).
A number of approaches have emerged for incor-
porating respondent uncertainty. These typically
involve a post-decision question asking the indi-
vidual how certain she is of her response to the CV
question. The format of this follow-up question can
be on a qualitative scale, such as “fairly sure” or
“absolutely sure” (as in Blumenschein et al., 1998;
and Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson, 1998), or
a numeric certainty scale, such as a 10-point Likert
scale in which 1 = very uncertain and 10 = very
certain (e.g., Champ et al., 1997; Champ and
Bishop, 2001; Ethier et al., 2000; Poe et al., 2002).
For responses to a hypothetical question in which
the respondent reports a high degree of uncertainty,
these studies generally find that recoding uncertain
“yes” responses to “no” yields estimates of WTP
which are a good approximation of actual pay-
ments.
6 This recoding scheme has effectively cali-
brated hypothetical responses in a number of
studies, but the cutoff point at which this technique
works varies. For example, Champ et al. (1997)
concluded that 10 was an appropriate cutoff,
Champ and Bishop (2001) used a cutoff of 8, and
Poe et al. (2002) chose 7. In contrast, Wang (1997)
found that treating uncertain responses as “no”
clearly underestimates mean WTP.
This approach assumes those who are uncertain
about their “yes” response in the hypothetical
setting are likely to respond “no” when confronted
with a real payment situation. While this assump-
tion is quite reasonable, it is also somewhat arbitrary,
because little is known about the underlying source
of uncertainty or hypothetical bias. Although a
growing body of experimental evidence is estab-
lishing the stylized fact that this approach may be
effective, it is not entirely clear why this inter-
pretation of uncertainty is preferable to alternative
interpretations and coding schemes. After all, if the
bias is caused by too many people responding
“yes,” then by construction, any procedure that
reduces the number of “yes” responses while hold-
ing the “no” responses constant must reduce the
difference between “yes” and “no” responses.
Recent results regarding another calibration tech-
nique, cheap talk (first introduced by Cummings
and Taylor, 1999), illustrate the importance of not
only establishing that a calibration technique works,
but also developing an understanding of why it
works. Cheap talk is an ex ante calibration technique
in which the researcher attempts to elicit unbiased
6  However, Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson (1998) found this
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responses by reading a script which draws respond-
ents’ attention to the hypothetical bias problem. As
observed by Cummings and Taylor (1999, p. 663),
“the cheap talk design was successful in eliciting
responses that were indistinguishable from responses
to valuation questions for actual payments.” This
approach is appealing because, like uncertainty
adjustments, it is intuitive and easily implemented.
According to the premise behind this technique,
simply making respondents aware of hypothetical
bias, regardless of its underlying causes, is suffi-
cient to eliminate it.
The evidence about cheap talk’s robustness is
mixed, however. In an unpublished manuscript,
Cummings, Harrison, and Osborne (1995) found
that a shortened version of the script was not effec-
tive, but a lengthier script similar to the one used by
Cummings and Taylor (1999) was successful.
Similarly, Poe et al. (2002) concluded a short script
did not influence decisions. Conversely, Aadland
and Caplan (2003) reported their use of a short
cheap talk script was effective. Based on findings
by List (2001), the long script did not reduce
hypothetical bias with experienced card dealers, but
was effective with inexperienced participants; both
Lusk (2003) and Aadland and Caplan (2003) report
similar results. Brown, Ajzen, and Hrubes (2003)
found that the long cheap talk script was successful,
but only for high payment amounts.
Our point is not that the calibration techniques
such as uncertainty adjustments or cheap talk are
inherently flawed or inappropriate. On the contrary,
there is a growing body of experimental evidence
suggesting these techniques do have an effect on
hypothetical WTP responses. Nevertheless, as the
cheap talk results indicate, these techniques may
not work in all situations. Clearly, without a better
understanding of the causes of hypothetical bias
and why these techniques are effective, they should
be used with caution. The next section provides a
discussion of some approaches that have been used
to interpret CV responses.
Toward a Better Understanding of the 
Causes of Hypothetical Bias
Interestingly, calibration techniques such as statisti-
cal bias functions and uncertainty adjustments have
been quite successful at mitigating hypothetical bias
without a formal theory to explain the fundamental
causes of the bias. This lack of theoretical support
may ultimately limit the generality of these methods.
A number of plausible reasons have been offered to
explain why hypothetical bias exists, but many of
these hypotheses have not yet been rigorously tested
in an experimental setting. This is a surprising con-
trast to the experimental literature in other contexts,
such as public goods or bargaining experiments.
Once the experimental evidence clearly established
stylized facts not predicted by neoclassical theory
(e.g., people do contribute to the public good, and
the modal offer in an ultimatum game is an even
split of the pie), subsequent research began to
explore possible explanations for these results.
Conversely, the experimental valuation literature
seems to have focused more on developing better
CV instruments and calibration techniques without
directly addressing the underlying sources of the
bias. This section discusses some of the possible
explanations for hypothetical bias that have been
posited and explores the evidence (experimental
and nonexperimental) about these hypotheses.
We begin with the simplest possible explanation
for hypothetical bias—the lack of any consequences
associated with an individual’s response. While this
may explain why an individual might misstate her
value, it does not account for why she system-
atically overstates her value. The results of some
induced-value experiments conducted by Taylor et
al. (2001) using an incentive-compatible referendum
support this rather straightforward observation.
They observed similar rates of misvotes (about
16%) in both the real and hypothetical referenda.
Clearly, the inconsequential nature of hypothetical
CV questions must be interacting with other
factor(s).
Perhaps one of the most intuitively appealing
explanations for hypothetical bias is that if the
respondent has a positive value for the good, and if
her response to the valuation question may increase
the likelihood of the good’s provision at little or no
cost to her, then it makes sense for her to report an
inflated value (Bohm, 1984; Harrison and Rutström,
forthcoming). Along these lines, it is possible that
individuals are merely expressing a positive attitude
for the good without necessarily agreeing to
contribute toward its provision (Champ and Bishop,
2001). While this theory may help explain the bias
in some public good settings, it fails to explain why
the bias is also prevalent in experiments with
private goods. Roughly half the experimental
studies include private goods, and hypothetical
values consistently exceed actual values even
though the outcome of the hypothetical survey has
no bearing on the provision of the good (Murphy,
et al. 2003). As shown by figure 1, private goods, in188   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
fact, have a larger share of calibration factors which
exceed 1.5 (54% vs. 36%).
7 Clearly, hypothetical
bias is not unique to public goods, and the under-
lying causes of the bias must be more complex than
simply an attempt to increase the likelihood of a
good’s provision at no cost to the respondent.
The notion of respondent uncertainty as a
potential source of bias has garnered much attention
recently. We have already discussed how this infor-
mation has been used to calibrate responses. Now
we consider some of the justifications that have
been proposed. Much of the research testing hypo-
theses about interpreting respondent uncertainty has
been conducted in a nonexperimental setting (e.g.,
Opaluch and Segerson, 1989; Ready, Whitehead,
and Blomquist, 1995; Li and Mattsson, 1995; Wang,
1997; Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998), highlighting the
need for more direct tests using experiments.
Opaluch and Segerson (1989) present one of the
earliest attempts to explain inconsistencies in valu-
ation responses using ambivalence theory. They
posit that individuals become ambivalent when
presented with difficult tradeoffs—e.g., between
money and environmental amenities—because they
may be unsure where the indifference curves lie.
Essentially, the value may not be a constant known
to the respondent, but rather a random variable. So,
although an individual may not know her value
precisely, she may be able to place it within a
range. The implications of this scenario are perhaps
best illustrated with an example. Consider a
respondent who estimates her willingness to pay for
a non-market good is “about $25 or so.” If asked
about her willingness to pay a rather large sum
(e.g., $500), this respondent may be able to unam-
biguously state, “no,” she is absolutely certain she
would not pay this much under any situation.
Similarly, she may express a high degree of
confidence about her willingness to pay extremely
small amounts (say $1). Uncertainty sets in as the
amount asked approaches $25.
Thus, ambivalence theory would suggest higher
levels of uncertainty correspond with amounts that
are approaching the respondent’s actual value,
whereas highly certain responses reflect values that
deviate noticeably from the true value. If ambiv-
alence theory is correct, then the recoding of
uncertain “yes” responses to “no” may not be fully
capitalizing on the information provided by these
uncertain responses. The data from Loomis and
Ekstrand (1998) are consistent with ambivalence.
Figure 2 is adapted from their study, and illustrates
the quadratic relationship between amount asked
and certainty. Respondents are relatively certain for
both low and high amounts asked, but for intermed-
iate values, certainty decreases. Contrasting results
were found by Champ and Bishop (2001), who
report that uncertainty is invariant to the amount
asked.
Ambivalence theory alone offers no guidance as
to how an individual will respond to an amount that
lies within her ambivalence region in either a hypo-
thetical or a real setting. If the individual is unable
to resolve the uncertainty through introspection and
is forced to make difficult choices, it does not
necessarily follow that responses will be biased
upwards. In fact, there are competing theories
regarding how an individual will respond. A model
of respondent behavior was developed by Hoehn
and Randall (1987) in which there is uncertainty
about the good described and the subject has
insufficient time to determine a value. Their model
suggests the CV respondent would adopt a conserv-
ative approach and reject deviations from the status
quo.
8 On the other hand, Crocker and Shogren
(1991) present a theoretical model which predicts
respondents will overstate WTP when preferences
are uncertain. A third possibility is that the indi-
vidual follows a lexicographic rule which gives
dominance to one of the alternatives (Ready,
Whitehead, and Blomquist, 1995).
Using the data from two field CV studies, Ready,
Whitehead, and Blomquist (1995) found a tendency
by those individuals asked a dichotomous choice
question to express a lower WTP than those who
are given an opportunity to express uncertainty
through a polychotomous choice instrument.
9 They
conclude that the dichotomous choice respondents
demonstrate some degree of conservatism (bias
toward the status quo, i.e., a “no” response),
although they acknowledge the results are also
consistent with lexicographic preferences which
give dominance to money over the environmental
amenity. If uncertain individuals systematically adopt
a conservative strategy (as proposed by Hoehn and
Randall, 1987), then this might lend some support
to the recoding of uncertain “yes” responses to “no.”
7  However, it is worth noting that most of the very large calibration
factors (> 5) are from public goods experiments.
8  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) discuss a status quo bias in conse-
quential settings with no uncertainty.
9  Rather than only allowing a simple yes/no response, the polychoto-
mous choice questionnaire allowed for six possible responses: “definitely
yes,” “probably yes,” “maybe yes,” “maybe no,” “probably no,” and






$0 $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 $350 $400 $450 $500
















Source: Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998
         Figure 2. Relationship between amount asked and certainty level
However, Hoehn and Randall focus on uncertainty
about the good, not uncertain preferences, and
whether uncertainty about the latter also implies a
conservative approach needs to be established.
More importantly, preference uncertainty is not
necessarily unique to hypothetical scenarios, and
therefore ought also to be present in real payment
settings. While consequential decisions might induce
an individual to engage in more intense intro-
spection which reduces the ambivalence region, this
does not necessarily imply that responses would
differ between hypothetical and real situations. In
fact, a greater tendency toward “no” responses in
hypothetical settings would suggest actual values
should exceed hypothetical ones—which brings us
back to the original question of why individual
behavior in a hypothetical setting deviates from that
in a real payment setting in a consistent, systematic
way.
Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) note that the
recoding of uncertain “yes” responses to “no” may
overlook the potential for fuller uses of the uncer-
tainty data, and they explore the implications of
different interpretations of respondent uncertainty.
They observed that roughly one-third of the “no”
respondents were uncertain (<8) about their
response. Similarly, more than half of the “no”
respondents in Champ and Bishop (2001) indicated
they were uncertain about their hypothetical
decision. These findings beget the question of how
to interpret the uncertain “no” responses.
10 Using
field CV data which include a certainty question,
Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) estimate six different
models. Their standard dichotomous choice model
does not incorporate the uncertainty response. Simi-
lar to Champ and Bishop (2001), models YES10,
YES910, and YES810 convert “yes” responses to
“no” if the level of certainty is <10, <9, and <8,
respectively. Following Li and Mattsson (1995),
their last two models interpret the numerical
certainty categories as the probability of actually
paying.
11 Their asymmetric uncertainty model
(ASUM) replaces the “yes” responses with a prob-
ability but keeps all “no” responses unchanged. The
symmetric uncertainty model (SUM) converts both
“yes” and “no” responses to probabilities.
Because Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) did not
include a treatment in which actual payments were
collected, we cannot tell which model most accur-
ately predicts the true WTP. Presumably the standard
dichotomous model suffers from hypothetical bias.
Since the WTP estimates from the two probabilistic
10  It should be noted that experimental evidence suggests people who
respond “no” in a hypothetical setting rarely change their minds when
confronted with real payment opportunities. For example, neither
Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutström (1994) nor Johannesson et al. (1999)
observed any subjects doing so.
11  These uncertainty adjustments assume (a) although an individual’s
valuation response may be biased, her certainty response is not; and
(b) all respondents interpret the uncertainty scale similarly (Loomis and
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models (SUM and ASUM) are not statistically dif-
ferent from the uncalibrated standard dichotomous
choice estimate, it appears these models failed to
adequately correct for the bias, lending some
empirical support to the recoding of uncertain “yes”
responses to “no.” However, Wang (1997) found
the opposite—that recoding uncertain responses to
“no” yields an underestimate of economic value.
Furthermore, theory provides no guidance about the
relative merits of two equally plausible and intui-
tive interpretations: converting uncertain “yes” to
“no” (e.g., Champ and Bishop, 2001; Poe et al.,
2002) or interpreting these responses as probabil-
ities (e.g., Li and Mattsson, 1995; Wang, 1997;
Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998). As acknowledged by
Champ and Bishop (2001), this sensitivity of the
calibration results to the interpretation of the
uncertainty response highlights the need for a better
understanding of the causes of hypothetical bias
and respondent uncertainty.
A Comment on Private Goods Experiments
Earlier, we noted that hypothetical bias experiments
have been conducted using both public and private
goods. The basic rationale for using private goods
is that if CV cannot produce accurate estimates in
this more familiar setting, then it is less likely to do
so with public goods. The results from experiments
with each type of good are consistent: hypothetical
values tend to exceed actual payments. Since the
direction of the bias is the same across good types,
it may seem reasonable to pool the data and use
inferences drawn from private goods experiments
to shed light on the hypothetical bias problem with
public goods. However, we are becoming increas-
ingly convinced that the sources of the difference
between hypothetical and actual values for public
and private goods may be due to entirely different
sets of factors. Most of the aforementioned
hypotheses about causes of hypothetical bias
discussed in the previous section make sense
primarily in the context of public goods. For
example, a higher hypothetical WTP for a private
good does not increase the likelihood of the good’s
provision, and it is unlikely that people are ex-
pressing a positive sentiment for an electric juicer
or baseball card.
With homegrown values, we can never be sure
whether the hypothetical or the actual response
reflects the true value. With public goods, some of
the factors discussed in the previous section may
potentially lead to overstated hypothetical values.
However, with private goods, we hypothesize that
perhaps it is the hypothetical values which are
truthfully revealed, but responses to real payment
questions are biased because the actual payments
are bounded by the market price for the good (net
of transaction costs). A subject is unlikely to agree
to actually purchase (or sell) a good in an exper-
iment at a price exceeding what she could pay
for it outside the lab. This would suggest that
values elicited in the lab may be censored by the
prevailing market price (Harrison, Harstad, and
Rutström, 2004). Without careful controls in the
experimental design, it is possible that an indi-
vidual truthfully reports her maximum WTP in a
hypothetical setting but censors actual economic
commitments at a perceived market price. Future
experimental research may want to focus on
testing this conjecture specifically, and more
generally on the applicability of the results from
private goods experiments to public good valuation
techniques.
Concluding Remarks
Let’s take stock of what we do and do not know. It
has been well-established that hypothetical values
exceed actual values, and calibration techniques
have had some success in aligning these values.
Less is known about the underlying causes of these
differences in values. The inconsequential nature of
the CV survey cannot alone explain these differ-
ences; it might explain greater variability in
hypothetical responses, but not higher mean and
median responses. Therefore, there must be an
interaction of the hypothetical decision with
other factor(s). Expressing positive sentiment
toward the good, or an attempt to increase the
likelihood of the good’s provision, is certainly
possible in a public goods setting, but this fails
to explain why hypothetical bias also exists with
private goods since these factors are not appli-
cable. There is some evidence that respondents
may be uncertain, but the causes of this uncer-
tainty and its implications for valuation are not
well understood. Ultimately, hypothetical bias is
likely to be individual-specific and a composite
of a variety of factors. Experiments can play a
key role in developing a better understanding of
what causes hypothetical bias and can assist
researchers in designing CV instruments which
incorporate these considerations.Murphy and Stevens Contingent Valuation, Hypothetical Bias, and Experimental Economics   191
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